Research · Methodology
Sources and Methodology
This site documents cases and patterns in which publicly searchable personal data appears to have enabled or facilitated real-world harm in Sweden. The goal is to be accurate, fair, and useful. This page explains how the material is selected and how evidence is classified.
Evidence standard
This site uses three evidence tiers:
Tier 1 — Verified direct use
Used when an official source — court judgment, government inquiry, police statement, or similarly reliable source — explicitly states that a search service or searchable people-data service was used to identify, map, or target the victim.
Tier 2 — Verified victim within a documented pattern
Used when the victimisation is clearly real and the broader method is well documented by authorities, but the public record does not prove which specific site or provider was used in that case.
Tier 3 — Authority-documented pattern
Used when a public authority or official inquiry documents the method as a recurring crime-enabling pattern, even if not every individual case is fully described.
What this site does not claim
- That every fraud, burglary, or harassment incident in Sweden was caused by people-search services
- That every listed provider played a role in every case
- That public access to all population data is identical in harm or intent
- That causation is proven whenever a risk factor exists
Source hierarchy
- Government inquiries and propositions
- Court judgments or official judicial references
- Police and other public-authority reports
- Brå and other official statistics
- High-quality reporting that adds case detail
Key official sources
Government and parliamentary sources
PDF via regeringen.se
regeringen.se
regeringen.se
riksdagen.se
Brå sources
Police and agency sources
Reporting used for additional case detail
Editorial rules
- Clearly separate verified facts from interpretation
- Name official sources whenever possible
- Avoid claiming a specific site caused a crime unless explicitly supported by the source
- Preserve uncertainty where uncertainty exists
- Prefer "used to map victims" over stronger language such as "caused the crime" unless causation is explicit
This site is not arguing that transparency has no value. It is arguing that mass searchable exposure of home addresses, ages, relationships, and other personal details can create predictable and preventable harms in a digital environment very different from the one in which older access norms developed.